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“Settle ‘em all”: Generalized 
Commitments and the Under and 
Over Enforcement of Antitrust 
Law 
Commissioner Almunia left office on 31 
October 2014. He leaves behind a 
snippet of high profile merger 
prohibitions, a large reform of State aid 
law, and a pinch of controversies in 
relation to ethical issues.i  But above all, 
Commissioner Almunia’s fabric brand 
has been his incommensurate proclivity 
for « settlements » in antitrust cases. 
Since the introduction of this procedure 
in May 2004, the Commission has 
adopted 31 commitments decisions 
under Article 9 procedure.  This is in 
contrast with the 11 prohibition 
decisions adopted under the standard 
Article 7 procedure.  In some sectors like 
energy, settlements have become the 
routine procedure. Even in idiosyncratic 
cases like the ongoing investigation 
against Google, Commissioner Almunia 
was reported to push for a settlement.   
Commissioner Almunia’s appetite for 
settlements is perfectly understandable. 
With it, the Commission follows an 
abridged procedure that potentially saves 
time and resources. And the Commission 
can obtain from settling parties remedies 
that come close to those applied in the 
standard procedure: price concessions, 
licensing commitments, asset 
divestitures, etc.  Moreover, the parties 
themselves often favor commitments. 
Settling firms know that with an Article 
9 decision, they can return to business 
quickly, and avert the stigmata – fines 
and negative publicity – associated with 
a finding of infringement. 
In a recent interdisciplinary paper, 
Professors Gautier and Petit (2014) 
consider whether a « generalized 
commitments » policy leads to optimal 
enforcement of competition law.ii  To 
this end, they develop a game-theoretical 
model of litigation under asymmetric 
information and uncertainty.iii Their 
objective is to assess whether the Article 
9 procedure optimally diagnoses 
anticompetitive harm and leads to 
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remedies that restore competition. They 
use the standard Article 7 procedure as a 
benchmark because, despite its 
procedural disadvantages (in terms of 
duration, paperwork, etc.), it entitles the 
Commission to better gauge harm and 
devise remedies. 
In their model, they find that this is not 
the case. A generalized commitments 
policy might lead to both over and under 
enforcement of competition law.  Over-
enforcement because whilst all firms 
systematically settle, not all of them 
would have been guilty in the standard 
Article 7 procedure. In other words, the 
Commission applies remedies to non-
cases. Under-enforcement because 
remedies are lower compared to those 
that would be imposed in the formal 
procedure.  Given the postulated 
asymmetry of information between the 
Commission and the firm relative to the 
importance of the alleged 
anticompetitive ‘harm’, in order to 
convince all firms to settle, the 
Commission must indeed accept 
commitments that set a minima i.e. that 
are equal to the expected sanction of the 
lowest possible ‘type’. Put differently, 
there is a sort of « race to the bottom » 
with generalized commitments.  As a 
result of this, one of the paper’s 
conclusions is that under a generalized 
commitments policy, the Commission 
adopts remedies too often but these 
remedies are too weak.	  
This, in turn, should lead the 
Commission to apply the commitments 
procedure more parsimoniously, and to 
adopt a « selective commitments policy »  
making a mixed use of Article 7 and 
Article 9 for cases where the suspected 
infringement, the relevant markets and 
the potential remedies are similariv - or at 
the extreme, to treat all cases under the 
standard procedure.  With a selective 
commitments policy, the Commission 
uses the threat of returning to the 
standard procedure if the firm does not 
negotiate commitments that are strong 
enoughv, threat that becomes ineffective 
if the policy is to “Settle ‘em all”.  A 
selective use of commitments alleviates 
the ‘race to the bottom’ effect. 	  
With this background, the paper then 
explores the type of « enforcement 
policy » that the Commission should 
follow. It argues that the choice of a 
generalized commitments policy, of a 
selective commitments policy or of a 
standard enforcement policy should 
hinge on the underlying case uncertainty. 
The paper stylizes two sources of 
uncertainty: the availability of legal 
guidance (Law, or L) and the factual 
knowledge of the market (Facts, or F).   
The L-uncertainty depends on a range of 
factors: absence of judicial precedent, 
divergences in precedents, existence of 
ongoing proceedings on a similar legal 
issue before the review and appeals 
courts; absence of guidance from other 
official instruments; ability to classify 
the conduct as a restriction of 
competition by object; etc. 
The F-uncertainty represents the 
Commission’s ability to establish on the 
facts that the conduct causes actual or 
potential anticompetitive harm. At the 
outset of the procedure, the Commission 
has no knowledge of this, and there is 
asymmetry of information between it 
and the firm in this respect.  Its ability to 
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establish harm will, in turn depend on a 
number of factors: presence of 
complainants, previous cases involving 
the same firm (in similar or other areas), 
size and number of relevant markets 
affected by the conduct, size of the firm's 
market shares, size of barriers to entry 
and scale, inelasticity of demand; 
duration of the alleged anticompetitive 
abuse, etc. 
 The model used in the paper produces 
clear-cut, innovative results that can be 
summarized as follows. First, there is a 
specific enforcement cost associated 
with the negotiation of commitments, i.e. 
the cost of applying too often a remedy 
that is too weak and this cost increases 
with L-uncertainty. In general, an 
important L-uncertainty is against 
commitments. Second, there is a specific 
under-enforcement cost when 
commitments are generalized and this 
cost increases with factual uncertainty. 
An important F-uncertainty is against 
generalized commitments. Accordingly, 
commitments are only recommended 
when there is little L-uncertainty. If this 
limited L-uncertainty is associated with a 
large factual uncertainty, selective 
commitments are recommended. If it is 
associated with a limited F-uncertainty, 
generalized commitments are 
recommended. Finally, when both L and 
F-uncertain, it is optimal to use the 
standard procedure. 
The paper then goes on to discuss those 
findings in light of the Commission’s 
decisional practice in the past ten years. 
It looks at energy and exploitative 
pricing cases as examples of 
“generalized commitments” and finds 
that the use of generalized commitments 
is apposite, given the low level of L and 
F uncertainty in this sector.  In contrast, 
it discusses the “patent litigation war” 
cases against Motorola and Samsung and 
suggests that the use of selective 
commitments may not have been 
optimal, given the large degree of L-
uncertainty surrounding those cases 
(denoted, in particular, by the fact that 
the question of the applicable legal 
standard had not yet been resolved by 
the Court of Justice of the EU when 
those decisions were adopted).  
The study’s main added value is to show 
that the commitments procedure is not a 
substitute to the standard procedure. 
Surely, the commitments procedure 
generates procedural economies for the 
Commission.  But a generalized 
commitments policy leads, under some 
conditions, to under and over 
enforcement costs that do not happen 
under the standard procedure. A critical 
feature of the paper is to explain that 
those enforcement costs may be caused 
by the Legal (L) and Factual (F) 
uncertainty that surrounds the interaction 
between the firm and the agency. 
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i See “Credit Agricole sparks probe of EU bias on rate-rigging”, Bloomberg, Sep 24, 2014 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-23/credit-agricole-sparks-probe-of-eu-bias-in-euribor-rigging-
case.html See also, “Enter Margrethe Vestager. Exit Joaquin Almunia pursued by an ombudsman”, 
Competition Law Insight, Nov 19, 2014, Available at  
http://www.competitionlawinsight.com/regulatory/european-commission/enter-margrethe-vestager-
103727.htm    
ii GAUTIER, A. and PETIT, N. (2014). Optimal Enforcement of Competition Policy: The Commitments 
Procedure Under Uncertainty. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2509729  
iii BEBCHUK, L. A. (1984). Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information, RAND Journal of 
Economics, 15(3), 404-416. See also, SHAVELL, S. (1989). Sharing of Information Prior to Settlement or 
Litigation, RAND Journal of Economics, 20(2), 183-195, and CHONE, P., S. SOUAM and A. 
VIALFONT (2014). On the optimal use of commitments decisions under European competition law, 
International Review of Law and Economics 37, 169-179. 
iv This is the policy that was recently followed in the Samsung (Article 9), and Motorola (Article 7) cases 
(related to abusive litigation by patent holders), in the Microsoft I (Article 7) and Microsoft II (Article 9) 
cases (related to the tying of Windows with complementary softwares), or in the or Mastercard (Article 
7) and Visa (Article 9) cases (related to multilateral interchange fees).  
v In a recent speech to the European Parliament, the Commissioner in charge of competition policy clearly 
announced that if Google refuses to improve its commitments proposal, the Commission will switch to 
the standard infringement procedure. “If Google’s reply goes in the right direction, Article 9 proceedings 
will continue. Otherwise, the logical next step is to prepare a Statement of Objections.” Presentation of 
the Annual Competition Report to the European Parliament by the Commissioner ALMUNIA, J. Sept. 23, 
2014 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-615_en.htm  
